3-938369-50-7 Symbolic Values, Occupational Choice, and Economic Development by Der Freien Universität Berlin et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft  
der Freien Universität Berlin 
 
 
Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 
 
 
2007/2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Symbolic Values, Occupational Choice, and Economic 
Development 
 
 
Giacomo Corneo and Olivier Jeanne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3-938369-50-7 
 Symbolic Values,
Occupational Choice, and Economic Development
Giacomo Corneo and Olivier Jeanne￿
February 2007
￿We are grateful to seminar participants at various universities and research institutes for helpful
comments. This paper was partly written while Olivier Jeanne was visiting the Department of Economics
of Princeton University, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. A¢ liation of authors: Corneo:
Department of Economics, Free University of Berlin, CEPR, London, CESifo, Munich, IZA, Bonn; Jeanne:
IMF, Washington, CEPR, London.
Addresses. Corneo: Department of Economics, FU Berlin, Boltzmannstr. 20, 14195 Berlin, Germany.
E-mail: gcorneo@wiwiss.fu-berlin.de. Jeanne: IMF, 700 19th Street NW, Washington DC 20431. E-mail:
ojeanne@imf.org.Abstract
Channeling human resources into the right occupations has historically been a key to
economic prosperity. Occupational choices are not only driven by the material rewards
associated with the various occupations, but also by the esteem that they confer. We
propose a model of endogenous growth in which occupations carry a symbolic value that
makes them more or less attractive; the evolution of symbolic values is endogenous and
determined by purposive transmission of value systems within families. The model sheds
light on the interaction between cultural and economic development and identi￿es circum-
stances under which value systems matter for long-run growth. It shows the possibility
of culturally determined poverty traps and o⁄ers a framework for thinking about the
transition from traditional to modern values.
Keywords: symbolic values, occupational choice, economic development, long-run growth.
JEL-Classi￿cation: D1, O1.1 Introduction
Economic take-o⁄s are typically accompanied by pervasive changes in the values endorsed
by people. For example, in western Europe the transition from a feudal to a capitalistic
mode of production was accompanied by a transition from traditional to modern values.
Whereas the former emphasize land possession, religion, and combat skill, the latter
praise work, education, and economic achievement. Also in the decades after World War
II, considerable changes in values have been documented in rapidly growing countries such
as the US, Japan, and western Europe.1
The concomitance of value change and economic development raises a fundamental
question of causation, one that has been intensely debated for a long time. A whole
spectrum of views exists, ranging from the culturalist one, according to which values
are the engine of economic growth, to the materialistic view, which confers that role
to technology and interprets value change as a mechanical adjustment. Far from being
merely academic, the issue of the interplay of culture and economic performance can have
profound policy implications. In some areas of the world, mass poverty goes hand in
hand with values and norms that are hostile to entrepreneurship and technical progress.
Culture may or may not be a crucial factor behind the failure of development policies in
countries caught in a poverty trap. And, if values do cause development, assessing their
"malleability" could make an important contribution to the design of successful policies.
In the current paper, we develop a tractable model that enables one to study the inter-
relationship between economic development and value change, with a focus on the value
attached to economic activities or occupations. We introduce the concept of "symbolic
value" to account for the observation that some personal characteristics, e.g. one￿ s pro-
fessional activity, seem to be invested with value by human beings. The value associated
with those characteristics determines the self-esteem of individuals as well as the esteem
that they receive from other individuals. Values are symbolic in the sense of being imma-
terial: they a⁄ect the well-being of individuals, but without altering their consumption
of material goods.
Formally, we shall de￿ne a value system as a function that maps from a set of judgeable
characteristics into a set of index numbers. Thereby, each "judgeable type" is associated
with a scalar that represents its value. Value systems are individual-speci￿c and determine
1Empirical sociologists Inglehart and Baker (2000) refer to this change as to a shift from a value
system that emphasized "survival" to one that emphasizes "self-expression".
1how much esteem individuals allocate to themselves and others. In turn, self-esteem and
the esteem received from others are arguments of an individual￿ s utility function.2
Arguably, value systems are heavily in￿ uenced by intergenerational transmission within
families.3 The current paper analyzes the polar case where parents choose the value sys-
tem of their children so as to maximize their children￿ s expected utility. The choice set
for parents is de￿ned so as to capture the fact that it is easier to teach the values one
endorses rather than values one has not internalized.
This model of values and value formation is combined with an endogenous growth
model in order to highlight the dynamic interaction between culture and economic devel-
opment. In particular, we address the following questions: Can values a⁄ect growth in
the long run? How does economic development a⁄ect values?
Our growth model has symbolic value attached to occupations.4 Following a line of
research pioneered by Aghion and Howitt (1992), Baumol (1990), Murphy et al. (1991),
and Romer (1990), we posit that occupations diverge in terms of their spillovers on the
returns of other occupations. For instance, as pointed out by Baumol (1990) and Mur-
phy et al. (1991), engineers and lawyers may contribute in quite di⁄erent amounts to
technological progress and growth.
The model in the current paper can generate equilibria consistent with either the
culturalist view, in which values have a long-run impact on prosperity, or the materialistic
one, in which values do not matter. Our main ￿nding relates to the circumstances under
which each type of pattern arises as an equilibrium outcome. The culturalist view of
development is more likely to be right if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption is low, predictability of the economic environment is high, and concerns for
social ostracism are large.
The intuition is as follows. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consump-
tion plays a key role in our model because it determines whether the marginal utility
of labor income in terms of consumption increases or decreases with economic develop-
ment. One the one hand, economic development raises productivity and so increases the
2Many researchers have studied the economic implications of a concern for social esteem, see Fershtman
and Weiss (1998a) for a review of the literature. Caring about the opinion of others may be wired into
human beings as the outcome of evolutionary selection, as argued e.g. by Fershtman and Weiss (1998b).
3See e.g. Fernandez (2007) for an insightful discussion of the empirical evidence on the impact of
parents￿culture on female labor force participation.
4In medieval towns, one￿ s association with a given craft, often organized in a guild, was a distinct source
of pride. Even nowadays, people feel the aura that surrounds various activities, e.g. being a soldier, a
scientist or an artist. Moreover, within a given society, its members often attach to the same occupation
quite di⁄erent symbolic values. For example, the entrepreneur is the hero of economic prosperity to
some, and the greedy speculator to others. Di⁄erent societies have throughout history exhibited di⁄erent
attitudes toward various occupations. By way of an example, the clergy in European societies enjoyed
much more respect one century ago than today.
2wage. On the other hand, it also increases the level of consumption and so decreases the
marginal utility in terms of consumption of a given increase in labor income. If the in-
termporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is larger than one, income di⁄erences
across occupations eventually weigh so much in terms of utility, that material payo⁄s
eventually dominate career choices. Then, di⁄erences in value systems exert no in￿ uence
on the long-run behavior of the economy. Conversely, if the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption is smaller than unity, symbolic values eventually dominate
occupational choice even if pay di⁄erences across occupations become arbitrarily large.
Uncertainty about the income opportunities of the various occupations enters the picture
as soon as individuals are risk averse with respect to self-esteem. Then, optimal social-
ization decisions may entail value diversi￿cation, i.e., transmitting an agnostic attitude
towards the symbolic value of occupations. If uncertainty is large enough, individuals
progressively abandon strong views about the worth of the various activities and esteem
concerns asymptotically evaporate. Fear of social ostracism fosters conformism and can
generate multiple value-led equilibria. Concerns for approval by others may dramatically
exacerbate the e⁄ect of values on long-run growth whenever the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution of consumption is smaller than one.
If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is low, predictability of
the economic environment is high, and concerns for social ostracism are large, culturally
determined poverty traps can arise. While economic growth could be fast under a di⁄erent
value system, "wrong" values may have such an adverse e⁄ect on the allocation of human
resources, that the economy fails to develop in spite of its favorable preconditions in term
of physical capital, knowledge, and protection of property rights.
Is there evidence of economies that might have experienced a cultural trap? According
to Baumol (1990), two historical examples that exhibit features of a cultural trap are
Rome and China. Ancient Rome failed to put into widespread practical use some of
the sophisticated technological developments that have been in its possession because of
contemptuous attitudes of the upper class towards commerce and industry. By contrast,
innovations spread like wild￿re in Italy during the Renaissance, a time at which the
upper classes had the "right values", i.e., considered commerce and industry honorable
activities. Imperial China during the Middle Ages is another example of a society where
rent-seeking activities with high prestige delivered larger rewards relative to productive
activities and that missed the opportunity of an economic take-o⁄in spite of its high level
of technological knowledge.
32 Links to the literature
The current paper is related to two strands of literature, one that studies the impact
of norms on economic growth and one that analyzes the formation and transmission of
cultural traits.
In the literature on economic growth, Cole et al. (1992) proposed a model where
multiple social norms to achieve status can be sustained as an equilibrium. Speci￿cally,
they characterized a wealth-is-status equilibrium and an aristocratic equilibrium where
birth determines one￿ s position in the social ladder. Growth is faster under the wealth
norm because the quest for status creates an additional incentive to accumulate. In
contrast to the current paper, status in their paper is sought for instrumental reasons,
i.e., to improve one￿ s access to mates. Furthermore, their paper does not deal with the
issue of how a norm is selected over others, whereas the current paper determines the
values system of society as the outcome of a decentralized process of socialization within
families.
The role of prestige attached to occupations plays a key role in Fershtman et al.
(1996), who developed a model in which individuals can either accumulate human capital
and become managers, or they do not accumulate human capital and become laborers.
Accumulating human capital produces knowledge that raises overall productivity, so that
economic growth is endogenous. Individuals are posited to care about their occupational
status and the status of each occupation is assumed to increase with the average human
capital of its members relative to the human capital in the other occupation.
Whereas Fershtman et al. just assume that higher social status is bestowed on the
occupation that enhances growth, in our model the esteem of occupations is endogenous
and depends on the values that parents transmit to their children. Hence, in our model
the symbolic ranking of occupations can but need not mimick their ranking in terms of
contribution to overall productivity growth. This is more general and in line with the
observation that in many societies higher status is associated with activities that are
unlikely to promote economic growth, like the clergy and the military. In our model, the
quest for esteem may or may not foster economic growth.
Empirical evidence that culture has a causal e⁄ect on economic development has re-
cently been o⁄ered by Tabellini (2006). He measures culture by indicators of individual
values and beliefs and proposes a method to isolate the exogenous component of culture.
Using data on European regions, Tabellini ￿nds that culture is strongly correlated with
current economic development, after controlling for education and political institutions.5
5Guiso et al. (2006) o⁄ers an excellent discussion of culture as a determinant of economic phenomena
and of the empirical methods that can be employed to identify the economic role of culture.
4Our model of value transmission is closely related to models of cultural evolution
proposed by Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001),6 who have studied settings in which parents
purposely socialize their children to selected cultural traits. This vertical socialization,
along with intragenerational imitation, determines the long-term distribution of cultural
traits in the population. Under some conditions, Bisin and Verdier￿ s theory predicts
convergence to a culturally heterogeneous population.
Our approach mainly di⁄ers from Bisin and Verdier￿ s theory in two respects. First,
Bisin and Verdier assume that parents want their children to have the same cultural trait
as themselves. They motivate this assumption by the possibility of "imperfect empathy"
on the side of parents. This means that parents evaluate their children￿ s actions using
their (the parents￿ ) preferences. In our theory, by contrast, parents choose the value
system of their children so as to maximize the children￿utility, and the objects that are
transmitted from parents to children are modeled in a di⁄erent way. Whereas in Bisin
and Verdier￿ s theory parents transmit a preference trait, in ours they transmit a value
system. The essential property of a value system is that, taking it in conjonction with
a course of action, it determines the esteem enjoyed by the individual. In our theory,
individuals have preferences over esteem and the usual list of consumption goods. The
advantage of modeling socialization to a value system rather than to a preference trait is
that one keeps preferences ￿xed, so that normative analysis based on the Pareto criterion
is possible.7 The cost of this modeling approach is that one has to add esteem to the
standard arguments of the utility function. But also Bisin and Verdier￿ s theory works
with an additional argument in the utility function, namely the o⁄spring￿ s preference
parameter.
A related appproach has been proposed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005), whose
notion of identity shares some important features with our notion of self-esteem. In their
theory, a person￿ s identity is associated with di⁄erent social categories and how people
in these categories should behave. Violating behavioral prescriptions causes a utility loss
and may produce responses by others who want to defend their sense of self. We follow
Akerlof and Kranton￿ s theory in that we also generalize the utility function so as to include
arguments that capture important nonpecuniary motivations of human action. However,
we employ a di⁄erent method to determine the prevailing norms of behavior. Akerlof and
Kranton use sociological evidence to formulate assumptions about behavioral prescriptions
that are likely to capture important aspects of reality. We derive those prescriptions as
6Bisin and Verdier￿ s approach to value transmission is applied to trust and economic development by
Francois and Zabojnik (2005).
7We refer to Corneo and Jeanne (2006) for a study of allocative e¢ ciency in the presence of endogenous
values.
5part of an equilibrium in a model based on individual optimization under constraints.
A recent paper by BØnabou and Tirole (2006) analyzes issues of identity in a model
where people value and invest in beliefs. Di⁄erently from our framework, they focus on the
individual management of beliefs and the cognitive mechanisms through which it occurs
when the individual is unsure of his own deep preferences. Thus, while theirs as well
as our paper endogenize identity-related payo⁄s, the two papers concentrate on di⁄erent
mechanisms of value formation.
3 Symbolic values
Our approach to symbolic values is based on four hypotheses. We make no claim of
originality, as they have been put forward by plenty of scholars before us.
Postulate 1: Evaluative Attitude
Individuals pass judgments of approval, admiration, etc., and their opposite upon cer-
tain traits, acts, and outcomes.
Individuals evaluate bundles of judgeable characteristics, also referred to as types. An
individual￿ s value system is a description of that evaluation. Formally, we shall de￿ne
the value system of an individual as a function that maps the set of judgeable individual
characteristics onto the real line. We take the set of judgeable individual characteristics
as exogenously given.8
We think of the evaluation of types as an essentially relative procedure by which
granting more value to a type implies that less value is attributed to the remaining ones.
A special case is one where the individual ranks all types and the symbolic value that the
individual associates with any particular type is that type￿ s rank. Since the total number
of ranks is given, assigning a higher value to a given type would then imply that a lower
value is associated to other types. However, we do not want to restrict value systems to be
rank-dependent because people￿s judgements seem to entail more than rank information:
two types that rank one after the other may be close or far apart in terms of their symbolic
values and that di⁄erence should be captured by two di⁄erent value systems. Therefore,
in order to capture both the relative dimension of values and value di⁄erences that do not
stem from di⁄erences in rank, we normalize the total amount of value that an individual
associates with all types to a constant; the allocation of that amount to the various types
is then de￿ned as the individual￿ s value system.
8A similar approach is adopted in the models of cultural evolution and identity. There, the existence
of a culturally relevant trait and that of a social category are taken as given.
6Postulate 2: Social approbativeness
Individuals desire a good opinion of themselves on the part of other people.
The relevant human environment for approbativeness may be an individual￿ s family,
friends, colleagues, neighbors, or society at large. The desired approbation may involve a
fear of contempt or indi⁄erence, or a craving for the interest, approval, praise, or admi-
ration of others. The current paper merely examines the esteem received by individuals
from society at large.
Postulate 3: Self-approbativeness
Individuals have a desire for self-esteem.
The desire for a pleasing idea of oneself presupposes self-consciousness. Humans are
both actors and spectators of what they are doing. Since they are evaluative beings, they
also judge themselves. Actually, at least some modest measure of self-esteem seems to be
indispensable to an endurable existence.
Postulate 4: Consistency
The standards of approbation or disapprobation which the individual applies to himself
are the same as those which he applies to other people.
This postulate corresponds to the rule of judging yourself as you would judge of others.
While psychologists have identi￿ed ways of self-deception, i.e., methods that individuals
adopt to manipulate their self-image, in the main individuals are subject to a consistency
constraint. It is di¢ cult to systematically approve in oneself acts which one condemns in
others, and when one does so, his fellows are quick to point out the inconsistency.
People￿ s well-being is supposed to depend upon both self-esteem and the esteem re-
ceived by other people, along with consumption of goods and services. When choosing a
course of action, individuals compare the pecuniary return of actions and the esteem they
carry.
Value systems can form within various socialization structures. This paper concen-
trates on the benchmark case of socialization by altruistic parents. A more general ap-
proach would have parents compete with other agencies of socialization like the school,
the church, and the children￿ s peers. We discuss this topic in the concluding Section.
4 The deterministic model
Time is discrete t = 0;1;::1. There are overlapping generations of individuals living
for two periods. In their ￿rst period, individuals are socialized by their parents; in their
7second period, they produce, consume, and socialize their children. Speci￿cally, at each
time t there is a continuum of mass 1 of adults, indexed by it 2 [0;1], and a continuum
of children, it+1 2 [0;1]. Individual it is the parent of individual it+1. Adult individuals
consume one homogeneous nonstorable good, which is used as the numeraire. Individuals
have common preferences and specialize in one of two activities or occupations, referred
to as a and b. Each parent chooses his occupation so as to maximize his utility, and the
values of his child so as to maximize his child￿ s expected utility.
A value system associates a non-negative index v(x) to occupation x 2 fa;bg. We
impose the normalization
v(a) + v(b) = 1; (1)
so that the value of an activity relative to the alternative, v(x)￿v(x0), is between -1 and
+1. Equation (1) can also be interpreted as setting an upper bound to the intensity of
value concerns.
Each individual is equipped with a value system. We denote the value system of an
individual i that was socialized in t ￿ 1 and is active in t by fv(a;it);v(b;it)g.
For a parent it may be di¢ cult to transmit values that are very di⁄erent from his
own. We therefore assume that a parent it chooses the values of his child subject to the
constraint
v(a;it+1) 2 [v(a;it) ￿ ￿;v(a;it) + ￿] \ [0;1]; (2)
where parameter ￿ 2 (0;1] captures the maximum distance between the parent￿ s values
and those of the child. This assumption can also be interpreted as one about the costs to
a parent of socializing his child to values that the parent does not endorse.
Values determine the individuals￿self-esteem and social esteem. In the current model
we concentrate on the role of self-esteem; social esteem will be introduced in the ￿nal part
of the paper.
An individual￿ s self-esteem is the value of his occupation according to his value system:
v(x(it);it), where x(it) 2 fa;bg denotes the individual￿ s occupation.
Individuals care about consumption and esteem. The utility of individual it is sepa-
rable in consumption and esteem concerns and given by,
U(it) = f (yt(x(it))) + h(v(x(it);it);
where f (yt(x(it))) =
(yt(x(it)))1￿￿
1￿￿ , ￿ > 0, captures utility fromconsumption and h(v(x(it);it)) =
￿ v(x(it);it) captures utility from esteem; ￿ > 0 parametrizes the strength of the self-
esteem concern. Assuming utility to be linear in esteem is only for the sake of simplicity;
this assumption will be relaxed in Section 7.
8Consumption equals the individual￿ s income. The incomes of occupations are denoted
by yt(x), x 2 fa;bg, and determined in the labor market according to
yt(x) = AtYx(nt); (3)
where nt is the number of individuals practicing occupation a at time t. We assume Y 0
a < 0
and Y 0
b > 0, and that Ya(￿) and Yb(￿) are bounded and equal for a value of n denoted by
n￿ 2 (0;1). These assumptions can be viewed as a reduced-form model of a competitive
labor market under decreasing returns to each occupation.
Economy-wide productivity A evolves according to
At+1 = (1 + g(nt))At; (4)
with g(0) > 0 and g0 > 0. Thus, a is the growth-inducing occupation.
Equations (3) and (4) can be seen as a reduced-form model of endogenous growth.
In the Appendix, we show how it can be derived from a full-￿ edged model based on
the distinction between traditional sectors and modern sectors that generate knowledge
spillovers.
An equilibrium is de￿ned as
-a distribution of values and occupations at each time, (v(a;it))it2[0;1] and (x(it))it2[0;1],
-a productivity path (At),
-a path for the material payo⁄s (yt(a) and yt(b)),
such that:
-for all it, the occupation x(it) maximizes U(it) conditional on yt(x) and v(x;it),
x = a;b,
-for all it, the values v(a;it+1); v(b;it+1) maximize U(it+1) subject to (2),
-equations (3) and (4) apply.
The initial conditions are given by a distribution of values for the initial generation,
(v(a;i0))i02[0;1] and an initial productivity level A0. Without restriction of generality, we
assume that v(a;i0) is nonincreasing with i0.
5 Values and occupations in the short run
In a short-run equilibrium, the values and occupational choices of one generation, v(a;it+1)
and nt+1, are endogenously determined, taking as given the previous generation￿ s values
and occupational choices.
Let v(a;it+1) ￿ Inffv(a;it)+￿;1g and v(a;it+1) ￿ Supfv(a;it)￿￿;0g, so that parent
it chooses the values of his child in the interval [v(a;it+1);v(a;it+1)]. In a perfect-foresight
9equilibrium, each parent knows the occupation of his o⁄spring. Hence, the parent puts
the maximal symbolic value on that occupation, since this increases his o⁄spring￿ s self-
esteem without a⁄ecting other determinants of his utility. Formally, an equilibrium path
necessarily satis￿es
v(a;it+1) = v(a;it+1) if x(it+1) = a; (5)
v(a;it+1) = v(a;it+1) if x(it+1) = b: (6)
If ￿ is su¢ ciently large, parents are not constrained by their own values in choosing
their children￿ s values, i.e. v(a;it) = 1 and v(a;it) = 0. Then, in an interior equilibrium
where both occupations are chosen by a strictly positive mass of individuals, the two
occupations must yield the same income. Otherwise a parent would be able to increase
his child￿ s welfare by putting all the symbolic value in the activity yielding the highest
income. Given our assumptions on Ya(￿) and Yb(￿), there is a unique equililbrium nt+1 = n￿
and a corner equilibrium cannot exist.
Of course, the outcome nt+1 = n￿ is identical to the one obtained in a model where
￿ = 0, i.e. agents do not care about esteem. Therefore, if ￿ is large, values do not a⁄ect
the allocation of manpower to occupations and exert no in￿ uence on the growth rate of
the economy.
In the rest of the paper we mainly concentrate on the case where ￿ is small, so that
parents may be constrained by their own values when choosing their children￿ s values.9
In this case, the material payo⁄s At+1Ya(nt+1) and At+1Yb(nt+1) could be di⁄erent in
equilibrium because some parents are unable to teach their children a su¢ ciently high
value for the activity with the highest material payo⁄.
As noticed above, v(a;it+1) and v(a;it+1) are the only possible equilibrium values of
individual it+1 for occupation a. His parent will opt for v(a;it+1) = v(a;it+1) if
f(At+1Ya(nt+1)) + ￿v(a;it+1) ￿ f(At+1Yb(nt+1)) + ￿(1 ￿ v(a;it+1)): (7)
The left-hand-side of this inequality is implicitly increasing with v(a;it) whereas the right-
hand-side is decreasing with v(a;it). Hence, there exists a critical level for v(a;it) such that
only parents with a higher value for occupation a choose v(a;it+1) rather than v(a;it+1).
We denote this critical level by b v(nt+1): Notice that the critical threshold b v(nt+1) is strictly
increasing with nt+1. Intuitively, if the size of occupation a is predicted to be larger, its
9Notice that the interval [v(a;it+1);v(a;it+1)] depends on v(a;it).
10income will be lower and choosing occupation a becomes optimal only for individuals
whose parents have a stronger symbolic preference for occupation a.
The equilibrium level of nt+1 is then solution to the ￿xed-point problem that the
number of parents with v(a;it) ￿ b v(nt+1) should be equal to nt+1. There is at least one
solution by standard ￿xed-point theorems. There cannot be more than one solution since
b v(nt+1) is increasing with nt+1.
Therefore, a short-run equilibrium exists and is unique. Values and occupations satisfy
(5) and (6); all individuals for whom (7) applies, choose occupation a and the remaining
individuals choose occupation b.
To illustrate, let individuals be ordered according to their parents￿values:
it < jt ) v(a;it) ￿ v(a;jt):
Thus, individuals with lower index have parents who put more value on occupation a. If
v(a;it) is continuous in it, the net bene￿t from choosing occupation a can be expressed as
Bt+1(nt+1) = f(At+1Ya(nt+1)) + ￿v(a;nt+1) ￿ f(At+1Yb(nt+1)) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ v(a;nt+1))
and B0
t+1 < 0, so that the equilibrium is unique. If Bt+1(0) > 0 and Bt+1(1) < 0, the
equilibrium must be interior and both occupations are chosen by a strictly positive mass
of individuals; the equilibrium size of occupation a is the unique root of Bt+1(nt+1) = 0.
However, the equilibrium can also be a corner solution in which all individuals choose
occupation a (nt+1 = 1 and Bt+1 ￿ 0) or b (nt+1 = 0 and Bt+1 ￿ 0). Notice that corner
solutions could not arise in the case of a su¢ ciently large ￿.
6 Growth and values in the long run
How do values evolve in the long run? The following result describes the evolution of the
distribution of values within the population.
Proposition 1 Values are dynastic: if individual it puts more value than individual jt
on occupation a, then this will be true of all their descendants:
v(a;it) ￿ v(a;jt) =) 8t
0 > t; v(a;it0) ￿ v(a;jt0):
Proof. We prove that if it puts more value on a than jt then this is also true of
their children it+1 and jt+1. Then this will be true, by forward induction, of all their
descendants. It is clear from the socialization condition (7) that if v(a;it) ￿ v(a;jt), it
11cannot be optimal for it to transmit values that induce his child to practice b while jt does
the opposite. So either v(a;it+1) = v(a;it+1) and v(a;jt+1) = v(a;jt+1), or v(a;it+1) =
v(a;it+1) and v(a;jt+1) = v(a;jt+1), or v(a;it+1) = v(a;it+1) and v(a;jt+1) = v(a;jt+1).
In all three cases one has v(a;it+1) ￿ v(a;jt+1). QED
This result, combined with the assumption that v(a;i0) is nonincreasing with i0, im-
plies that v(a;it) is nonincreasing with it at all times t.
We now turn to the central issue of this paper, namely the interplay of values and
economic outcomes in the long term. Again, we take as a benchmark the case where
individuals are not concerned about values, i.e., ￿ = 0, and ask whether values can make
a di⁄erence with respect to long-run growth.
If ￿ = 0, then the arbitrage condition yt(a) = yt(b) applies for all t, implying Ya(nt) =
Yb(nt) and nt = n￿. Then, as shown by (4), the growth rate is constant and equal to
g(n￿).
In order to assess the role of values in the case ￿ > 0, the concept of "family special-
ization" is useful. We shall say that a family i is specialized in activity x at time t if for
all t0 ￿ t, individual it0 practices this occupation and has all symbolic value invested in
this occupation, i.e.,
8t
0 ￿ t; x(it0) = x and v(x(it0);it0) = 1:
We denote by st(x) the number of families specialized in occupation x at time t.
We are now ready to establish the following fact:
Proposition 2 Assume ￿ < 1. Then, the families asymptotically specialize themselves
in the same way as in the value-less equilibrium:
lim
t!+1st(a) = n
￿;
lim
t!+1st(b) = 1 ￿ n
￿:
The long-run growth rate is the same as in the value-less equilibrium, g(n￿):
Proof. On the equilibrium path one necessarily has,
A
1￿￿
t
jYa(nt)1￿￿ ￿ Yb(nt)1￿￿j
1 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿; (8)
otherwise all individuals, irrespective of their values, would choose the same occupation,
namely the one with the higher pecuniary payo⁄. Since n￿ 2 (0;1), the pecuniary payo⁄
12of the chosen occupation would then be lower than the one of the other occupation, a
contradiction. Hence, the condition (8) must hold.
Condition (8) , ￿ < 1 and limt!+1 At = +1 imply that limt!+1 jYa(nt)1￿￿ ￿
Yb(nt)1￿￿j = 0 on the equilibrium path. This means that
lim
t!+1nt = n
￿: (9)
This implies that the long-run growth rate is the same as in the value-less equilibrium.
This property also implies that for any " > 0, there is a T such that for all t ￿ T;
n￿ ￿ " < nt < n￿ + ". The dynasties it ￿ n￿ ￿ " practice activity a after time T and
invest symbolic value in this activity as quickly as they can, endowing activity a with all
the symbolic value after time T + 1=￿ at the latest. The dynasties jt ￿ n￿ + " practice
activity b after time T and have endowed this activity with all the symbolic value after
time T + 1=￿ at the latest. This proves the ￿rst part of the Proposition. QED
Proposition 2 identi￿es a simple condition under which the materialistic view is as-
ymptotically correct. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is
larger than unity, the value system of a society at a given point in time will not have any
e⁄ect on the rate of economic growth that that society will experience in the long run. By
the same token, two economies with the same fundamentals but with very di⁄erent value
systems will converge to the same growth rate. Thus, if convergence to the asymptotic
growth rate is fast, there may be no point for policy makers to try to in￿ uence people￿ s
values.
As a counterpart of the materialistic result, we establish:
Proposition 3 Assume ￿ > 1. Then, the families asymptotically specialize themselves
according to
lim
t!+1st(a) = n;
lim
t!+1st(b) = 1 ￿ n;
where n could be lower or higher than n￿. The asymptotic growth rate g(n) could be higher
or lower than g(n￿), depending on the initial distribution of values. Skewing the initial
distribution of values toward occupation a increases the long-run growth rate.
Proof. Let us introduce a variable e vt, implicitly de￿ned by
A
1￿￿
t+1
￿ ￿ 1
max
n jYa(n)
1￿￿ ￿ Yb(n)
1￿￿j = ￿(2e vt ￿ 1); (10)
13where ￿ > 1. Since the l.h.s of (10) is strictly positive and converges to zero as At+1 goes
to in￿nity, e vt converges to 1=2 from above.
Suppose for a moment v(a;it) = e vt. Then, the r.h.s. of (10) is the utility gain for it
from choosing occupation a rather than b which is due to their di⁄erent symbolic values.
If ￿ were 0, this would also be the corresponding gain for it+1. The l.h.s. of (10) is the
maximum utility gain that it+1 could possibly obtain from choosing one occupation over
the other because of their di⁄erent income.
Now, let v(a;it) be arbitrary. If v(a;it) ￿ e vt, parent it ￿nds it optimal to transmit
v(a;it+1) to his o⁄spring, i.e., v(a;it+1) = v(a;it+1) ￿ v(a;it) ￿ e vt. Since e vt monotonically
converges from above, e vt+1 ￿ e vt. By transitivity, v(a;it+1) ￿ e vt+1. Hence, also individual
it+1 optimally socializes his o⁄spring to occupation a and the same applies to all future
generations. Therefore, all families that satisfy v(a;it) ￿ e vt specialize in activity a in
￿nite time.
A symmetric argument applies to activity b. The parents with v(a;it) ￿ 1 ￿ e vt
optimally transmit v(a;it+1) to their children, who in turn satisfy v(a;it+1) ￿ 1 ￿ e vt+1
and so on. These families specialize in activity b in ￿nite time.
Since e vt asymptotically converges to 1=2, all families must fall in one of the two
categories sooner or later, i.e.
lim
t!+1st(a) + st(b) = 1;
which proves the ￿rst part of the Proposition.
We then illustrate the multiplicity of long-run growth rates by looking at the range
of n that can be sustained in steady growth equilibria. Let us assume that at time 0 a
fraction n of individuals has all symbolic value in occupation a and a fraction 1 ￿ n of
individuals has all the value in occupation b. Then, this state of a⁄airs persists for ever
if a parent specialized in activity x has no incentive to shift the values of his o⁄spring to
the other activity, i.e.
A
1￿￿
1
1 ￿ ￿
Yx(n)
1￿￿ + ￿ ￿
A
1￿￿
1
1 ￿ ￿
Yx0(n)
1￿￿ + ￿￿
which is true if,
A
1￿￿
1
￿ ￿ 1
jYa(n)
1￿￿ ￿ Yb(n)
1￿￿j ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿):
This condition ensures that the parents maximize their children￿ s welfare by transmitting
their own values. For ￿ < 1 it de￿nes a nondegenerate interval for n that includes n￿ in
its interior. The asymptotic growth rate is g(n).
We now come to the last part of the Proposition. Given some initial distribution
v(a;i0), let us skew it toward occupation a in the sense of (weakly) increasing v(a;i0) for
14all individuals i0, keeping v(a;i0) decreasing with i0. Let v0(a;i0) denote the resulting
distribution. Let A0
t denote the productivity path under the distribution v0(a;i0) and let
e v0
t be implicitly de￿ned by
A
01￿￿
t+1
￿ ￿ 1
max
n jYa(n)
1￿￿ ￿ Yb(n)
1￿￿j = ￿(2e v
0
t ￿ 1): (11)
Furthermore, de￿ne ￿t ￿ fijv(a;it) ￿ e vtg and ￿0
t ￿ fijv0(a;it) ￿ e v0
tg.
Consider the occupational choices of generation 0. Since v0(a;i0) ￿ v(a;i0) for all
i 2 [0;1], the corresponding equilibrium will have n0
0 ￿ n0. It follows that A0
1 ￿ A1, so
that e v0
0 ￿ e v0. Therefore, ￿0 ￿ ￿0
0. Proceeding forwards, v0(a;it) ￿ v(a;it) for all i 2 [0;1]
will also be true for all t > 0, so that ￿t ￿ ￿0
t always holds. This implies that the number of
families that eventually specialize in occupation a is larger under the distribution v0(a;i0).
Hence, also the long-term growth rate is larger under that distribution. QED
Propositions 2 and 3 can be related to Keynes￿famous speculations on the "Economic
Possibilities for Our Grandchildren", where he conjectured that if economic growth con-
tinues long enough, material needs will be satiated and human beings will devote their
energies to non-economic purposes (Keynes, 1972). This is the case, in the current model,
if occupational choices are increasingly in￿ uenced by values as At increases to in￿nity;
then, in the limit, all individuals choose the occupation with the highest symbolic value
irrespective of material payo⁄s.
It is noteworthy that our proof of the long-run dominance of symbolic rewards does
not rely on a bounded utility from material consumption. If the utility from consumption
is logarithmic (￿ = 1), the long-run growth rate remains in￿ uenced by values.10
A major insight from Proposition 3 concerns the possibility of a culturally determined
poverty trap. Consider two economies with the same preferences and the same initial
technology. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is smaller than
one, a small di⁄erence with respect to their initial value systems may cause their income
ratio to asymptotically converge to zero or in￿nity. In this case, values matter for long-run
growth, but they do not necessarily foster growth. Their long-term impact depends upon
the shape of the value system of society at the initial period.
10Then, the range of possible steady states n satis￿es jlog(Ya(n)=Yb(n))j ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿): Proposition 3
can also be generalized to utility functions f(￿) for which there exists some minimal consumption level
c such that ￿(y) ￿ 1 for all y > c, where ￿(y) ￿ ￿f00(y)y=f0(y) is not restricted to be constant. Also
Proposition 2 can be generalized in a similar fashion.
157 Uncertainty, values, and growth
Proposition 3 identi￿es circumstances under which culture can be decisive for an economic
take-o⁄ and thus policies that in￿ uence values can have a major impact on development
and prosperity. We now scrutinize to what extent this assessment remains valid if one
allows income uncertainty to enter the picture. Whereas the basic model of the previous
Section posits that parents know with certainty the income levels that their o⁄springs can
achieve in each occupation, technology shocks may introduce a considerable amount of
uncertainty about those variables. That uncertainty could result in socialization strategies
that systematically di⁄er from those derived in the deterministic model, with distinctive
consequences for long-run growth.
In order to study the role of economic uncertainty, we modify equation (3) so as to
include an aggregate shock in the determination of future incomes, i.e.
yt(x) = (1 + ￿t(x)￿)AtYx(nt); (12)
where ￿t(a) = ￿￿t(b) = 1 with probability 1=2 and ￿t(a) = ￿￿t(b) = ￿1 with probability
1=2, and ￿ 2 [0;1) is the size of the uncertainty.11 We assume that uncertainty about
￿t(x) is resolved between period t ￿ 1 and period t: whereas individuals have incomplete
information when they select the value system of their children, they face no uncertainty
when they choose their own occupation.
When choosing his o⁄spring￿ s values, a parent it￿1 maximizes the expected utility of
his child,
E (f (yt(x(it))) + h(v(x(it);it)):
As in the deterministic model, we posit f (yt(x(it))) =
(yt(x(it)))1￿￿
1￿￿ , ￿ > 0. While we also
maintain the assumption that h(v(x(it);it) is bounded and satis￿es h(0) = 0; h0 > 0, we
now posit h00 < 0, i.e., the utility from self-esteem is concave. Below, we comment on the
linear case.
Before studying the model economy with values, let us consider the benchmark case
where values do not matter. If h0 = 0, the arbitrage condition yt(a) = yt(b) applies for all
t, implying (1+￿t(a)￿)Ya(nt) = (1+￿t(b)￿)Yb(nt). If ￿t(a) = 1, then this condition is met
by a unique and time-invariant nt, denoted by n￿(￿), where ￿ denotes the corresponding
state of the world, n￿ is strictly increasing in ￿, and n￿(0) = n￿. If ￿t(b) = 1, the size of
sector a is given by n￿(￿), where ￿ denotes the corresponding state of the world, n￿ is
strictly decreasing in ￿, and n￿(0) = n￿.
11The model of the previous Section can be viewed as the special case of the current one in which
￿ = 0.
16Absent a concern for esteem, in equilibrium nt takes the value n￿(￿) in states ￿ and
value n￿(￿) in states ￿. The growth rate varies accordingly. The expected growth rate is
time-invariant and equal to 1
2[g(n￿(￿)) + g(n￿(￿))].
Turn now to the economy with values, i.e., h0 > 0. By a continuity argument, if ￿ > 0
but su¢ ciently small, then the equilibrium properties derived in the case ￿ = 0 examined
in Sections 4-6 carry over to the stochastic model of this Section. Speci￿cally, provided
that ￿ < 1, values can make a di⁄erence with respect to long-run growth if and only if
￿ > 1. We are now going to show that if ￿ is su¢ ciently large, this possibility vanishes,
i.e., the materialistic view holds true also if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption is smaller than one.
Consider the socialization problem at the individual level. When individual it chooses
its occupation conditional on his values, three cases can a priori occur: the individual
chooses activity a irrespective of his income opportunities, he chooses activity b irrespec-
tive of his income opportunities, or he chooses activity a if and only if yt(a) > yt(b).
In order to prepare for the next result, suppose for the moment being that ￿ = 1,
so that parents are free to choose values in the entire [0;1] interval. Then, individual
it￿1 optimally selecting the values of his child chooses one of the following strategies:
values specialization, i.e. the parent endows one occupation with all the value and the
child chooses that activity with probability one; or, values diversi￿cation, i.e. the parent
endows each occupation with the same value and the child chooses the occupation with
the highest income.
To ascertain when each strategy is optimal, let us compute the child￿ s expected utility
under each strategy. Let y!
t (x), ! 2 f￿;￿g, denote the income of activity x in state !
at time t. Then, specialization in activity a is an option if putting all the symbolic value
on that occupation induces the child to choose this occupation even if it yields a lower
pecuniary payo⁄, that is if,
max
! ff (y
!
t (b)) ￿ f(y
!
t (a))g < h(1): (13)
If this condition is satis￿ed, the parent can induce his child to choose occupation a by
putting all the value on this occupation. Analogously, if
max
! ff (y
!
t (a)) ￿ f(y
!
t (b))g < h(1); (14)
the parent can induce his child to choose occupation b by putting all the value on this
occupation.
If condition (13) is satis￿ed and the parent chooses v(a;it) = 1, his child￿ s expected
utility equals
1
2
[f(y
￿
t (a)) + f(y
￿
t (a))] + h(1):
17If condition (14) is satis￿ed and the parent chooses v(b;it) = 1, his child￿ s expected welfare
is
1
2
[f(y
￿
t (b)) + f(y
￿
t (b))] + h(1):
Since we have supposed ￿ = 1, the parent can always select values that induce his
o⁄spring to choose the occupation with the largest material reward. Then, two cases are
possible. Either there is an activity that delivers the higher income independently of the
state of the world, or each activity maximizes income in a di⁄erent state. In the ￿rst case,
there is no point in diversifying values: the parent will invest all the symbolic value in the
activity that dominates the other one in terms of income. In the second case, the child￿ s
expected utility amounts to
1
2
h
max
x f (y
￿
t (x)) + max
x f
￿
y
￿
t (x)
￿i
+
1
2
[h(v(a;it)) + h(1 ￿ v(a;it))];
which only depends on values if h is nonlinear. Whereas in the linear case the solution to
the socialization problem is not unique, under our assumption h00 < 0, the child￿ s expected
utility is uniquely maximized by v(a;it) = 1=2 and equals
1
2
h
max
x f (y
￿
t (x)) + max
x f
￿
y
￿
t (x)
￿i
+ h
￿
1
2
￿
:
Therefore, if no activity dominates the other one in terms of income irrespective of the
state of the world, the optimal socialization strategy could be to allocate an equal amount
of symbolic value to each activity. This diversi￿cation strategy could never be optimal in
the deterministic model. Diversi￿cation actually is optimal if the child￿ s expected utility
is larger in that case rather than in the specialization case, i.e., if
1
2
h
max
x f (y
￿
t (x)) + max
x f
￿
y
￿
t (x)
￿
￿ max
x ff(y
￿
t (x)) + f(y
￿
t (x))g
i
> h(1) ￿ h
￿
1
2
￿
:
Turning to the general case, where parameter ￿ 2 (0;1], we establish
Proposition 4 Assume ￿ > 1. If ￿ is large enough, then the the economy behaves has a
value-less one and the value systems of all families converge to f1=2;1=2g.
Proof: At any t, individual it surely chooses the occupation with the largest income,
irrespective of his value system, if
min
! jf (y
!
t (a)) ￿ f(y
!
t (b))j > jh(v(a;it)) ￿ h(1 ￿ v(a;it))j: (15)
If ￿ ! 1, then y
￿
t (a) ! 0 and y￿
t (b) ! 0. Then, because ￿ > 1, one has f
￿
y
￿
t (a)
￿
!
￿1 and f (y￿
t (b)) ! ￿1. It follows that
lim
￿!1
min
!
jf (y
!
t (a)) ￿ f(y
!
t (b))j = +1;
18so that if ￿ is large enough, individual it chooses the occupation with the largest income
independently of his values. By setting ￿ arbitrarily close to 1, condition (15) is met for
all families and all periods. Then, in equilibrium the arbitrage condition yt(a) = yt(b)
applies for all t, implying that the economy behaves exactly as in the absence of values.
If ￿ is so large that values do no a⁄ect occupational choice, individual it￿1 chooses
v(a;it) in the interval [v(a;it);v(a;it)] so as to maximize the child￿ s expected utility from
self-esteem, which is given by
1
2
[h(v(a;it)) + h(1 ￿ v(a;it))]:
The solution is to set v(a;it) as close as possible to 1/2 subject to the constraint that it
must be in the interval [v(a;it);v(a;it)] , that is v(a;it) = 1=2 if 1=2 2 [v(a;it);v(a;it)]
and v(a;it) = v(a;it) if v(a;it) > 1=2, v(a;it) = v(a;it) if v(a;it) < 1=2. It follows that
jv(a;it)￿1=2j ￿ jv(a;it￿1)￿1=2j and that the value system of every family converges to
f1=2;1=2g. QED
Hence, provided that the predictability of the future incomes from the two occupa-
tions is low, the equilibrium can be consistent with the materialistic view even if the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is smaller than one. The intuition
is straightforward. If the amount of uncertainty is large, the income di⁄erential between
the two occupations is also large and if this di⁄erential increases, at some point an in-
dividual will choose the occupation with the higher income, irrespective of his values.12
Anticipating this, the individual￿ s parent will diversify the individual￿ s values, thereby
contributing to insure the individual￿ s esteem. Hence, it is risk aversion with respect to
esteem, or concavity of h, that can prompt parents to select a diversifed value system for
their children.
If ￿ > 0 but not so large that material rewards are overwhelming, values can still
matter for long-run growth if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption
is smaller than one. However, di⁄erently from the deterministic case, in the stochastic
case families do not necessarily specialize themselves in the long run. Speci￿cally, we
establish the following fact:
Proposition 5 Assume f(y) = log(y). Let the population at time 0 consist of three
groups: na individuals who put all the value in occupation a, nb individuals who put all
the value in occupation b, and nab individuals who attach the same value 1=2 to both
occupations. Then, there can exist intervals for na; nb and nab for which this distribution
12This also holds for f(￿) logarithmic, which means that Proposition 4 carries over to ￿ = 1.
19of values persists over time. The growth rate is stochastic and its average level increases
with na.
Proof: Fix strictly positive numbers na; nb and nab that satisfy
(1 ￿ ￿)Ya(na) < (1 + ￿)Yb(nb + nab) (16)
(1 ￿ ￿)Yb(nb) < (1 + ￿)Ya(na + nab) (17)
and na+nb+nab = 1. The families that put all symbolic value in occupation a and always
practice that occupation never have an incentive to deviate if
log
￿
(1 + ￿)Yb(nb + nab)
(1 ￿ ￿)Ya(na)
￿
￿ h(1) ￿ h(￿):
A symmetric condition ensures that all the families that put all symbolic value in occu-
pation b and always practice that occupation never have an incentive to deviate:
log
￿
(1 + ￿)Ya(na + nab)
(1 ￿ ￿)Yb(nb)
￿
￿ h(1) ￿ h(￿):
The remaining families never have an incentive to deviate if
Inf
￿
log
￿
(1 + ￿)Yb(nb + nab)
(1 ￿ ￿)Ya(na)
￿
;log
￿
(1 + ￿)Ya(na + nab)
(1 ￿ ￿)Yb(nb)
￿￿
￿ h
￿
1
2
+ ￿
￿
￿h
￿
1
2
￿ ￿
￿
:
(18)
To sum up, all strictly positive numbers na; nb and nab that sum to 1 and satisfy (16)
and (17) describe an equilibrium con￿guration if they also satisfy (18) and
h(1) ￿ h(￿) ￿ Sup
￿
log
￿
(1 + ￿)Yb(nb + nab)
(1 ￿ ￿)Ya(na)
￿
;log
￿
(1 + ￿)Ya(na + nab)
(1 ￿ ￿)Yb(nb)
￿￿
:
It is easy to verify that there exist parameter constellations such that for each constellation
there exists a set of triples (na;nb;nab) that ful￿ll all conditions.
The equilibrium growth rate is then stochastic and its expected value is given by
1
2
[g (1 ￿ nb) + g (na)]:
Increasing na necessarily increases the expected growth rate. QED
Uncertainty about income opportunities can make families diversify their values. In-
creasing uncertainty beyond a certain point generates cultural convergence, i.e. all families
20eventually share the same value system and the esteem di⁄erential between the occupa-
tions vanishes. This ￿nding suggests an interpretation for the diminished role of pro-
fessional pride in modern as compared to some traditional societies. The pronounced
craft honor in medieval towns, e.g. goldsmiths, barbers and merchants in Italian free city
states, was likely to be supported by strong con￿dence in professional continuity along
familiy lines, which gave parents an incentive to invest in the symbolic value of their own
occupation. Conversely, the industrial revolution and the liberalization of markets for pro-
fessions implied a large degree of occupational mobility and a lower degree of predictability
of future economic activities. This may have dissuaded parents to invest symbolic value
unilaterally in their own occupation, since this would have created an impediment for
their children to fully take advantage of new economic opportunities.
8 Social esteem
Concerns for social esteem are likely to in￿ uence occupational choice and in this way to
a⁄ect the growth prospects of an economy. The concept of symbolic value introduced
above allows one to think about the social esteem that individuals enjoy because they
practice a given occupation. The social esteem in which an individual is held may be
de￿ned as the average of the esteem granted to his activity over the whole society:
socv(x(it)) =
Z 1
0
v(x(it);j)dj: (19)
We may then write individual utility as
U(it) = f (yt(x(it))) + h(v(x(it);it) + ￿z(socv(x(it))); (20)
where z0 > 0 and ￿ ￿ 0 captures the strength of the concern for social esteem. This
parameter may be thought of as re￿ ecting both psychological predispositions and the
intensity of social interactions. If individuals enter frequent interactions with a relatively
small number of people over most of their lifetime, like in a traditional village, then
one might assume that ￿ is larger than in the case of a loose network of anonymous,
short-lived, contacts, like in a modern city.
The presence of social esteem generates an externality in the choice of values: while
parents choose values so as to maximize their children￿ s expected utility, they directly
a⁄ect the esteem that other children will receive. This externality entails a distinctive
mechanism by which value systems and economic development interact, one that was
absent in the model where the only symbolic reward of occupations comes in form of
self-esteem.
21To illustrate the distinctive implications of a concern for social esteem, we embed (19)
and (20) in the deterministic model of Sections 4-6. It is easy to verify that Propositions
2 and 3, derived under the assumption that ￿ is small, carry over to the model with
social esteem. That is, values matter for long-run growth if and only if the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of consumption is smaller than one. However, if individuals care
about social esteem, a long-run e⁄ect of values can also exist if ￿ = 1, i.e., if parents are
not constrained in the choice of their children￿ s values.
To establish that result, consider the short-run equilibrium of the model with social
esteem and ￿ = 1. In such an equilibrium, (5) and (6) apply with v(a;it+1) = 1 and
v(a;it+1) = 0. Then, the self-esteem associated with occupations a and b are respectively
given by 1 and 1 and the corresponding social esteems are nt+1 and 1 ￿ nt+1. It follows
that the net bene￿t of occupation a relative to occupation b is
Bt+1(nt+1) = [f(At+1Ya(nt+1)) ￿ f(At+1Yb(nt+1))] + ￿ [z (nt+1) ￿ z (1 ￿ nt+1)]:
The ￿rst term in square brackets on the right-hand side of this equation is decreasing with
nt+1 because the di⁄erence between the income of type a individuals and type b individuals
decreases with the relative number of type a individuals. The second term shows that the
relative social esteem granted to occupation a is increasing with the number of individuals
who value this occupation, nt+1. If ￿ is large enough, the second term dominates the ￿rst
one, implying that there are two stable short-run equilibria, one in which all individuals
practice a and one in which they all practice b.
Thus, a concern for social esteem can lead to conformism. By choosing to invest
symbolic value in the future occupation of his o⁄spring, an individual reduces the social
esteem for the other occupation and thus induces other individuals to imitate him. This
may generate a bandwagon e⁄ect in the formation of value systems and the choice of
occupations.13
Proposition 6 Assume ￿ = 1. Let the entire population at time 0 put all the value in
the same occupation and practise that occupation. There is an equilibrium in which this
state of a⁄airs persists for ever if and only if ￿ > 1:
13This phenomen was apparently observed by Blaise Pascal in the middle of the 17th century, when
he noted: "La chose la plus importante ￿ toute la vie, est le choix du mØtier: le hasard en dispose. La
coutume fait les macons, soldats, couvreurs. "C￿ est un excellent couvreur", dit-on; et, en parlant des
soldats:"Ils sont bien fous", dit-on; et les autres au contraire: "Il n￿ y a rien de grand que la guerre; le
reste des hommes sont des coquins". A force d￿ ouir louer en l￿ enfance ces mØtiers, et mØpriser tous les
autres, on choisit; ... car des pays sont tous de macons, d￿ autres tous de soldats, etc. Sans doute que
la nature n￿ est pas si uniforme. C￿ est la coutume qui fait donc cela..." (PensØes et Opuscules, Larousse,
Paris, 39th ed., 1934, p. 28-29).
22Proof: Suppose without loss of generality that the population is specialized in occu-
pation b. Then,
f(A0Yb(1)) + ￿z (1) ￿ f(A0Ya(0)) + ￿z (0)
must hold in the initial short-run equilibrium. This state of a⁄airs can persist if
￿ [z (1) ￿ z (0)] ￿ A
1￿￿
t [Ya(0) ￿ Yb(1)]; (21)
for all t > 0. Since n￿ 2 (0;1), it must be the case that Ya(0) > Yb(1). Then, condition
(21) is always met as At increases to +1 if and only if ￿ > 1. QED
Multiple value-led equilibria can persist inde￿nitely if the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption is smaller than one.14 If ￿ is large enough, there exists both
an equilibrium with a long-run growth rate equal to g(0) and one with with a long-run
growth rate equal to g(1). Of course, g(1) > g(n￿) > g(0), so that values matter in an
extreme form for long-term growth in this case.
Notice, however, that the interpretation of the current result is di⁄erent from the one
in the model with no social esteem (￿ = 0) and ￿ small. In the current framework, values
do not matter in the sense that their initial constellation shapes the long-run behavior of
the economy. They matter because the expectation of a certain constellation of values in
the future and the desire to avoid their o⁄spring incurring ostracism lead parents of all
generations to inculcate values that validate that expectation.
Proposition 6 suggests that circumstances can exist under which values are responsible
for big di⁄erences in development between economies with small di⁄erences in technology.
Consider the case of two identical countries in a long-run equilibrium where everybody
performs activity b, the traditional activity, and g(0) ’ 0. Now conceive a development
opportunity in the following sense: at some point in time, a technology shock raises the
income level that can be obtained from activity a, the modern activity, i.e., function
Ya(￿) shifts upwards in both countries. If the improvement of opportunities di⁄ers in the
two countries, condition (21) may be satis￿ed after the shock in only one country. While
culture and income will not change in this country, the other one will experience a cultural
revolution and an economic take-o⁄.
9 Conclusion
The endogenous growth model developed in this paper o⁄ers a simple theoretical frame-
work for addressing the old question of the interaction between economic development
14As it is easily checked, they can also persist in the logarithmic case.
23and value systems. People￿ s economic activity typically results from the deliberate choice
to practice a distinctive occupation, often for the entire duration of one￿ s economically
active life. For most people, work is one de￿ning element of the self, not simply because a
large fraction of one￿ s lifetime is absorbed by work but also because it is mainly through
work that the person consciously shapes her environment, i.e., expresses her individuality.
Therefore, economic activity is a central category for de￿ning one￿ s identity and a natural
object of value judgements.
Our model explores the economic implications of the idea that people can invest in the
value of occupations, i.e., they can in￿ uence their children￿ s evaluations of occupations.
Speci￿cally, we have derived the evolution of value systems that arises when parents select
them so as to maximize their children￿ s expected utility. In our framework, economic vari-
ables and value systems mutually a⁄ect each other. On the one hand, the path of income
opportunities associated with the various occupations a⁄ects the values transmitted by
parents to children. On the other hand, both one￿ s acquired values and others￿evaluations
of occupations a⁄ect one￿ s choice of economic activity; in this way, value systems a⁄ect
the growth prospects of the entire economy.
Symbolic values can have a long-term e⁄ect on economic growth in our model. The
culturalist view of development is more likely to be correct if the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution of consumption is low, predictability of the economic environment is high,
and concern for social ostracism is strong. In those cases, culturally determined poverty
traps can exist. Under di⁄erent circumstances, the materialistic view may be the correct
one: technological change can be disruptive of value systems that existed for a long time
and entail a process of cultural convergence.
The model in this paper may be extended in several directions. Given its stress on en-
dogenous value formation, a further exploration in this area would be warranted. Values
are not only transmitted from one generation to the next, but also within generations.
This horizontal socialization occurs in society at large via imitation and learning from
peers and role models; "oblique transmission" occurs when values are acquired from non-
parental adults.15
Horizontal socialization could be introduced in our model alongside vertical socializa-
tion. De￿ne for each young individual a probability distribution over value systems: the
individual￿ s actual value system may be assumed to be randomly selected acccording to
that probability distribution. The probabilities associated with the various value systems
15Models of horizontal socialization were pioneered by evolutionary anthropologists Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985), who exploited analogies between cultural transmission
and epidemics. The purposive aspect of cultural transmission was introduced later by Bisin and Verdier
(2000, 2001).
24may be assumed to respond to both the values taught by parents and the values endorsed
by society at large. More realistically, reference groups could be de￿ned from which an
individual is relatively likely to acquire values.
Following Bisin and Verdier￿ s approach, one may further assume that socialization
by parents is costly, and that parents can increase the probability of determining their
children￿ s values by investing more resources in socializing them. This ingredient may
produce further insights into the value system of a society. To the extent that vertical
socialization requires parents to spend time with their children, a substitution e⁄ect might
dominate by which more productive parents spend less time with their children and the
social esteem of highly productive occupations is relatively low. If vertical socialization
can be bought - e.g. services of private teachers and clubs are used to in￿ uence the
children￿ s values - an income e⁄ect may dominate so that wealthier parents are more
likely to shape values. Then, the values of the a› uent would tend to be overrepresented
in society.
25APPENDIX
A microfoundation of Equations (3) and (4).
There is a traditional and a modern sector and the two activities produce two di⁄erent
goods, denoted by a and b. Utility of consumption is Cobb-Douglas, i.e. it increases with
the aggregate consumption index
c =
￿ca
￿
￿￿ ￿
cb
1 ￿ ￿
￿1￿￿
:
An income y allows an individual to buy a quantity y=p of composite good, with the
consumption price index given by
p = p
￿
ap
1￿￿
b ; (22)
where pa and pb are the prices of goods a and b respectively.
An individual produces a quantity e Atqa at time t if he is active in sector a. The
productivity level in sector b is constant over time and given by qb units of good.
Market prices are competitively determined. The Cobb-Douglas assumption implies,
npa e Aqa
(1 ￿ n)pbqb
=
￿
1 ￿ ￿
:
Using (22) and the expression above to substitute out the relative price pa=pb implies that
the real incomes in the two sectors are given by
ya = pa e Aqa=p = ￿q e A
￿
￿
1 ￿ n
n
￿1￿￿
and
yb = (1 ￿ ￿)q e A
￿
￿
n
1 ￿ n
￿￿
;
where q is a shorthand for (qa=￿)￿(qb=(1 ￿ ￿))1￿￿. Then, the incomes to activities a and
b can be written as
Ya(n) = ￿q
￿
1 ￿ n
n
￿1￿￿
;
Yb(n) = (1 ￿ ￿)q
￿
n
1 ￿ n
￿￿
;
and the productivity parameter is given by
At = e A
￿
t :
Notice that even though productivity grows in the modern sector only, income grows
at the same rate in the two sectors because of the increase in the relative price of the
traditional good.
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